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The Reform of the Legal Immigration System
of the United States
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr.*
Introduction
The last time that the nation's legal immigration system was
independently studied by Congress was in the mid-1960s. Following the
enactment of the Immigration Act of 1965 and as a direct result of its
provisions, immigration has slowly reemerged again as a substantial influence
on the size and composition of the U.S. population and labor force. In
contrast to all other advanced industrial nations, the United States stands
alone in its willingness to admit each year hundreds of thousands of legal
immigrants and refugees for permanent settlement as well as to tolerate mass
abuse of its laws by an even larger annual number of illegal immigrants.
Indeed, a 1986 study of contemporary American society concluded that
"America's biggest import is people".
Last year Congress took some tentative action to address the major
problem in the immigration policy area: illegal immigration. It is still
problematical, however, whether the passage of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act (IRCA) of 1986 will help reduce the overall immigrant flow to
manageable numbers. The absence of an effective identification system,
concern over inadequate funding for enforcement, and the omission of any
attention to the powerful "push" forces (Le., population growth, poverty,
unemployment, human rights violations, and corruption in the countries of
origin of the illegal immigrants) all suggest that illegal immigration will
probably continue at high and, possibly, increasing levels. Moreover, the
full labor market effects of the four amnesty programs created under IRCA
cannot yet be estimated. The amnesty recipients will be free to search for
jobs anywhere in the economy and will no longer be restricted to only certain
sectors. How many of their immediate relatives who will also enter the labor
force over the coming years is anybodies guess -- but the numbers should
be large. Thus, the labor market of the nation is going to have to make
these added accommodations over the next few years to whatever the legal
immigration is also doing.
*
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2Hence, I must say that from the outset that I am not very enthusiastic
about the prospect of admitting more legal immigrants until the full
ramifications and effectiveness of IRCA can be reasonably ascertained. It
is, however, a propitious time to review the nature of the legal immigration
system itself and I welcome the opportunity to express my views.
The Legal Immigration System: General Comments
It has long been my opinion that the legal immigration system is the
heart of the problems that the nation has had with its overall immigration
policy. I have felt that the policy has not been accountable, fair, or
enforceable. By being accountable, I mean does the design of the policy
meet the needs of contemporary society? By being fair, I mean are all persons
who can fulfill the stated purpose of the policy given equal chance to
qualify? By firm, I mean is the policy capable of carrying out its stated
objectives.
Last year the passage of IRCA was designed to address the enforceability
issue that had plagued immigration policy up until then. I think it is still
an open question whether the weapons and funds Congress has provided are
up to the task but there is at least temporary hope in this area.
As for the other two concerns -- accountability and fairness -- both
are absent from existing immigration policy. It is in this context,
therefore, that I will comment on both the Kennedy and the Simpson bills.
Accountability. The issue of accountability centers on why the nation
should have a liberal legal immigration policy when all other nations of
the world do not. With the exception of the treatment of refugees, asylees,
and immediate family members, it seems to me that it is the role of immigrants
in the labor market -- their economic role -- that should be the driving
force that shapes our nation's immigration policy at this juncture of the
nation's history. For regardless of what causes immigrants to come to the
United States, most must seek employment to survive. Indeed, immigration
presently accounts for at least one-third of the annual growth in the U.S.
labor force -- a labor force that is growing at a rate much faster than that
of any of our major industrial competitors. Yet today, less than 5% of the
immigrants and refugees who are legally admitted to the United States each
year are admitted on the basis that the skills and education they possess
are actually known to be in demand by U.S. employers. The percentage is
considerably less than 1% if illegal immigrants are included in the total
immigrant flow.
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To be accountable, the policy should be both quantitatively and
qualitatively flexible in its admission mechanisms. The number who are
admitted ought to be easily employed without endangering either the job
opportunities or working conditions of native born workers. Thus, who
precisely should be admitted should be determined by the demonstrated needs
of the economy (i.e., they should help fill job shortages).
Under the existing immigration system, there is little effort given
to make immigration policy accountable for its economic consequence. Instead
3it embodies a hodgepodge of dubious political objectives. Unfortunately,
I feel that both of the pending bills perpetuate this undesirable feature.
Although there are some rearrangements of the preference categories
in both bills and some changes in treatments of refugees and immediate family
members in the Simpson bill, both perpetuate the notion that the nation needs
to have a continuation of substantial flows of immigrants each year. They
both would admit about 550,000 to 650,000 persons a year with visas, or as
immediate family members, or as refugees or asylees. If anything, both bills
would allow circumstances for even more persons to be admitted. The Simpson
bill at least provides for a tentative cap on immigration by forcing a trade-
off between more than a "normal flow" of refugees and immediate family members
with other family preference admissions unless the President declares a
"refugee emergency". It also slightly reduces the definition of immediate
family members. I would support the rationales behind both of these changes.
The revised Kennedy bill explicitly raises the visa numbers from 270,000
to 350,000 with no changes made in the immediate family definitions and no
linkage to refugee and asylee flows. There is no real rationale provided
in either bill, however, as to why the nation should continue to admit so
many immigrants and refugees. Under current population projections based
on a total immigration flow of one million persons a year (a reasonable
estimate for the annual number of immigrants, refugees, asylees, and illegal
immigrants) and a continuation of the nation's existing low fertility rate
of 1.8 children per woman of child bearing age (an unreasonable assumption
since fertility rates of immigrants tend to be higher than for natives and
the immigrant population is increasing annually), the nation will have a
net population increase of 100 million persons by the year 2080 (i.e., the
population will be 340 million persons in less than a century). With this
in mind, there simply is no reasonable justification for increasing
immigration levels simply for the sake of doing so.
Neither bill provides any quantitative flexibility in setting the
aggregate number of persons annually seeking permanent settlement in the
United States. Given the enormous scale of this annual flow, annual
immigration levels should be linked to short run domestic economic
circumstances. During periods of high unemployment such as we have had here
in the 1980s and continue to have at this moment, the number of admissions
should decline on a scale that is directly related to unemployment. The
changes in the aggregate numbers of immigrants each year should be borne
entirely by the family preference categories. The mechanism to set these
annual admission levels should be given to an administrative agency of
government to set each year subject only to a ceiling imposed by Congress.
J
Likewise, both bills retain family preference categories as the mainstay
of the nation's legal immigration system. When refugees and asylees are
added, it means that overwhelmingly most of those who enter will continue
to be admitted without regard to whether they can contribute to the nation's
labor market needs. Token changes are provided in both bills that would
increase the number of non-family related immigrants -- called "independent
immigrants" but the current occupational preferences (the third and sixth
preferences) are kept intact in the Kennedy bill at 54,000 while being
slightly reduced to 50,000 in the Simpson bill. The Kennedy bill adds a
4point system to admit 50,000 non-preference immigrants that is geared to
productivity factors (i.e., age, education, fluency in English etc.). The
Simpson bill does the same for about 35,000 "selected immigrants" who would
be admitted only on the basis of productivity factors and who could only
apply for these visas abroad. Thus, both bills pay homage to labor market
principles, but they are primarily designed to perpetuate the status
~
whereby most of those who are admitted are done so on a non-labor market
basis. Given the fact that the nation is in the midst of a rapid
transformation of its industrial and occupational patterns, immigration policy
should primarily be responsive to these emerging trends. If it cannot be
demonstrated that immigrants can provide the types of skills needed to fill
jobs that are in short supply by citizen applicants, they should not be
admitted. The exceptions should only be for immediate family members or
for refugees for whom the federal government is willing to bear the full
financial cost associated with providing them with skills and education needed
to qualify for available jobs. other family preferences should only be
admitted when, as discussed above, the domestic economy is operating at or
near a full employment level (3 or 4 percent full employment). In other
words, I feel it is time that immigrants should be expected to meet the same
test that President John F. Kennedy asked of citizens almost two decades
ago -- namely "ask not what America can do for you but what can you do for
America."
I would even go so far as to say that those admitted under the
occupational preferences or the independent immigrant categories should be
admitted on a probationary basis for say 2 years during which time, if they
cannot maintain employment in the occupations for which they were admitted,
they would not be eligible to adjust their status to become a permanent
resident alien and they would be expected to leave. Neither bill addresses
this concern.
Also, I feel that the point systems and occupational preferences should
also be qualitatively flexible. The presumptions of the proposed bills is
that preferences should be given to more highly skilled and educated
applicants. Under present circumstances, this is a justifiable conclusion.
But it also implicitly says that this nation is incapable of preparing its
citizen youths for these top-of the line jobs. I pray this is not the case.
We simply cannot allow our nation's education and training systems to continue
to fail to meet its obligations to prepare students for these types of high
paying jobs. Presently, we have no choice but to seek some immigrants to
fill some of these jobs because of the gross deficiencies in our academic
and vocational training programs at all levels of instruction. But this
is a sad state of affairs that should not be perpetuated. If we can address
these chronic educational needs -- the U.S. Department of Labor, after all,
projects that 40 percent of the growth in occupations between now and the
year 2000 will be in the executive, administrative, professional and technical
occupations, the employment future for many native Americans is bleak. I
would prefer, however, to be optimistic and hope that human resource
development will become the nation's number one domestic priority -- just
as it is in Japan. If this does happen, it is conceivable that future labor
market shortages will occur in the semi-skilled and less skilled occupations.
If so, the one element of human resource policy that could fairly be used
5to recruit workers for these types of shortages would be immiqration policy.
If such shortages do not materialize, of course, there should be no
immigration of such persons. The point is that immigration policy should
also be qualitatively flexible enough to meet whatever compositional changes
might occur in the demand for labor in the future. Now the need is for
skilled and educated workers; it might not be in the future. There are only
minor measures in both bills that would allow the admissions system to adjust
to such circumstances.
The only way to bring flexibility to the admission system is to give
an administrative agency the authority to annually set both the quantitative
level and the qualitative composition of immigrant flows that would both
be responsive to changing labor market conditions. The detailed legislation
in this area only introduces more rigidities. Immigration policy must be
recognized for what it is: a key element of national economic policy. While
I welcome the fact that both bills introduce point systems to determine some
of those who seek to be admitted, I think that the details and the points
should be set by an administrative agency in accordance with demonstrated
need. I do not see why the legislation should cement certain categories
and certain point values into legislation. It is too hard to change laws.
These topics should be subject to regular administrative review which would,
of course, have to be defended before Congress. In an ideal world, the agency
making the decision would be required to conduct special research studies
to back up the categories it uses and the point values it assigns at given
times. Under such circumstances, I would say that the principle of using
points based on certain immigrant characteristics should be extended to all
of the non-family preference categories.
Both bills make the system more legalistic and mechanistic than it
currently is. They reflect the fact that, by the accidental quirk of fate,
the design of immigration policy was given in 1941 to the Department of
Justice and the Judiciary Committees of Congress. The legal community has
seized control of what is essentially an economic issue. In the process,
they have created a nightmarish system whereby there is essentially no
administrative discretion allowed anywhere. Just as the nation did last
year with its tax codes, it is now time to simplify the immigration system.
Fairness. Both bills retain family preferences as the essential
rationale for the nation's immigration. The revised Kennedy bill even adds
30,000 visas that would be made available for such would-be immigrants.
It is not exactly clear whether the Simpson bill will increase or decrease
the numbers over existing levels since other groups such as immediate family
relatives, refugees, and asylees are lumped together in ~he 465,000 visas
that would be available for family preferences. It seems likely that the
total number of family preference visas will go up. Both bills do shift
some of the weights assigned to the various preference categories. The
Kennedy bill reduces the number of 4th and 5th preference visa numbers and,
if I read the Simpson bill correctly, it would phase out both the 4th and
5th preference visas. I would support the direction of both of these changes.
Reducing the 4th and 5th preferences is highly desireable; elimination of
both would be more preferable. Both of these categories highlight the
nepotistic and discriminatory nature of the existing system. In no other
6realm of national life would such blatant assaults on fairness be tolerated.
I see no reason why family preferences should be given any more than token
mention -- perhaps for certain hardship cases -- in the immigration law.
The maintenance of a system whereby 80 percent of the visa numbers are given
sheerly on the basis of having a relative who is a citizen or resident alien
is in my view, indefensible in this day and age.
Historically, it is well known that family reunification became the
main entry route as the direct result of the efforts of persons who wanted
to maintain the obnoxious national origin system during the 1965 overhaul
of the legal immigration system. Over the objections of the Johnson
Administration which favored labor market consideration as the primary and
major rationale for the nation's immigration system, Congress did the reverse:
it downplayed labor market considerations and advanced family reunification
as the primary rationale. Hence, the principle of family reunification does
not have a particularly proud history. In my view, it is as distasteful
now as it must have been in 1965 to reformers who wanted a truly non-
discriminatory immigration system.
Conclusion
It has long been my firm hope that Congress would turn its attention
to the conceptually outmoded and indefensible features of the existing legal
immigration system. Unfortunately, I find little in either of these bills
about which I can be excited. While I am not fearful of any of the suggested
changes, I am disappointed about the loss of opportunity to address a major
national problem. Namely: the legal immigration system is inflexible,
mechanistic, discriminatory, nepotistic, and unaccountable for its economic
consequences. The entire system needs to be overhauled. Both bills propose
cosmetic changes around the margins. Fundamental change is what is required.
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